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FISCAL POLICYProviding a comprehensive group taxation regime would bring fairness, simplicity
and certainty of tax outcome for Canadian corporations. As it is, Canada’s approach
to corporate group taxation gives rise to a number of problems, including higher
administrative and transaction costs, unfairness among different types of
corporations, uncertainty, and weakened international competitiveness. Also, the
web of intragroup transactions and structural changes needed to achieve some
degree of tax consolidation adds complexity and artificiality to the tax system and
the business environment since the sole purpose for these business activities is to
gain a tax advantage. 
These concerns point to the need to consider a statutory framework allowing for the
transfer of profits and losses among domestic members of a corporate group for
federal and provincial tax purposes. I propose a system in which each eligible
subsidiary of a group would determine its own tax base separately, including taxable
profits, current-year non-capital tax losses and federal credits. These amounts would
then be transferred, on paper, from the subsidiaries to the parent company, which
would then pay taxes for the entire group based on the aggregated transferred
amounts and its own tax attributes. Provincial taxes payable could be computed
based on the existing interprovincial allocation formula.
Such a comprehensive group taxation regime would improve the competitiveness of
Canada’s tax system with respect to the determination of the corporate tax base and
would ensure that the tax system remains neutral with respect to business-
structuring decisions, thereby contributing to a better environment for domestic
and foreign investment in Canada.
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C
anada’s taxation system for
groups of affiliated companies
differs from that of most other
developed countries. The difference
stems from the absence, in Canada, of
a formal system for allowing the
transfer of corporate losses and profits
among related companies for group-
wide, tax-minimization purposes. 
This Commentary argues for a new system whereby
corporate groups would gain the ability to transfer
profits and losses between a parent corporation
and its subsidiaries.
Related corporations are generally permitted to
transfer losses through some complex transactions,
but these usually give rise to high administrative
costs, additional risks or timing issues. For
example, some intragroup loss transfers are
possible through tax-planning techniques
involving financial transactions among group
members. Other methods include corporate
reorganizations involving the merger of related
companies or the winding up of a subsidiary by its
parent. In all cases, however, the process consumes
considerable time and resources.
The debate over group taxation arises primarily
from the asymmetric tax treatment of losses and
profits. While profits are fully taxed when they
arise, tax losses are only given partial recognition –
they are refundable only against current taxes or
taxes paid in the prior three years. While unused
losses may be carried forward, their real value
diminishes with time, and in some cases may never
be claimed. For example, losses cannot be claimed
in the event of a business failure.
Given the global economic slowdown, issues
related to the recognition of losses for tax purposes
will gain profile. Incomplete tax refundability of
losses leads to distortions in the tax system,
particularly through its negative effect on risk-
taking and business investment at early stages of
development. One mechanism to improve loss
utilization in general is to provide for the sharing
of tax attributes among related corporations. 
Background
The debate over group taxation has a long history.
Back in the 1930s and 1940s, the federal
government allowed groups of related companies
to file corporate income tax returns on a
consolidated basis, subject to a set of restrictive
conditions.1 Following the repeal of consolidated
reporting in 1952, the Carter Royal Commission
on Taxation (1966) recommended that the federal
government adopt a system of consolidated
taxation for corporate groups of wholly owned
companies. The Standing Senate Committee on
Banking, Trade and Commerce made a similar
recommendation in 1971 (Brooks, 2008). 
As well, the federal government studied the issue
internally and proposed – as part of Finance
Minister Michael Wilson’s 1985 budget – a formal
group tax-loss transfer system along with draft
proposed amendments to the Income Tax Act.
While Ottawa has not followed through on that
proposal, both the Auditor General of Canada
(1996) and the Technical Committee on Business
Taxation (1998) recommended that the federal
government review its 1985 proposal for a
corporate tax-loss transfer system. More recently,
the Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of
International Taxation (2008) urged the federal
and provincial governments to collaborate in
considering how a tax consolidation system could
operate in Canada.
The debate around loss transfers is funda-
mentally linked to a theoretical discussion of who
owns the loss. Is it the business as a legal entity, 
the company in a situation where it holds the
majority of shares, or upstream individual
shareholders? If one takes the view that business
profits and losses ultimately belong to individual
shareholders, one should not object to the transfer
Independent • Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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1 For example, group tax consolidation was allowed only for wholly owned subsidiaries of a domestic parent company performing related and
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of losses and profits among commonly held
members of a corporate group, provided that such
transfers do not give rise to abusive tax planning.
In this paper, I propose a new system whereby
corporate groups would gain the ability to transfer
profits, losses and federal credits for tax purposes
between the parent corporation and its
subsidiaries. Federal and provincial taxes for the
consolidated group would be payable by the
parent company but each subsidiary would still be
required to determine separately its own tax base.
Provincial taxes payable would be determined on
the basis of the existing interprovincial allocation
formula. 
This proposal would ensure that Canada’s
corporate tax system is: (1) internationally
competitive with respect to the determination of
the tax base, not only tax rates; (2) neutral with
respect to corporate organizational decisions; and
(3) limits unnecessary administrative costs and
complexity for corporate groups wishing to enter
into loss-consolidation arrangements.
The next section briefly describes tax-planning
strategies adopted by some corporate groups in
Canada to shift profits and losses among group
members. The following section reviews the main
concerns raised by the current system. The last
section discusses the policy implications of the
current system and suggests a viable new approach
that could be adopted by both federal and
provincial governments.
Consolidation of Profits and Losses in
Corporate Groups: Current Practices 
Under the Income Tax Act, each incorporated
business – including a firm controlled by another
corporation – is required to file and pay tax
separately. Because some members of a corporate
group may be in a loss position while others may
be profitable, the group overall may have to pay
taxes even though its consolidated taxable income
could be zero or negative. This situation is
illustrated in Box 1. 
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Box 1: Tax Treatment of Corporate Groups as Opposed to Businesses Operating Through Separate
Divisions of One Single Legal Entity






Outcome: Subsidiary A pays corporate income tax of $100 times the corporate tax rate. Subsidiary B pays no tax
and has a tax loss carry-over of $100. The corporate group pays corporate income tax.
Situation 2:  Businesses Operating
Through Separate Divisions of







Outcome: Loss of Division B offsets taxable profit of Division A. The corporation has no taxable income for the
year and, therefore, no tax liability.Commentary 284 | 3
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In this scenario, Subsidiary A has a profit of
$100 while Subsidiary B has a loss of $100; the
total tax liability of the group is $100 times the
corporate tax rate even though on a consolidated
basis the loss of Subsidiary B would wipe out the
profit of Subsidiary A, leaving no taxes to be paid. 
Although not formally recognized in legislation,
a variety of tax-planning techniques enable
corporate groups to achieve some degree of taxable
income consolidation.2 Most of these strategies
involve the transfer of tax losses among related
corporations, using transactions that are technically
in compliance with the Income Tax Act. 
The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) has
developed an internal policy to deal with the
utilization of tax losses within a corporate group.3
In practice, a corporate group is generally
permitted to restructure or utilize various tax-
planning strategies – as long as each transaction
complies with existing laws and regulations – for
sharing profits and losses among its member
corporations to reduce overall tax liability. The
federal government has taken the position that
even though such transactions have been
undertaken primarily to obtain a tax benefit, they
would generally not fall under the application of
the Income Tax Act’s anti-avoidance rule.4
This section provides an overview of currently
permitted tax-planning strategies that may be used
to transfer profits and losses within members of a
corporate group to reduce group-wide tax
liabilities.
1. RESTRUCTURINGTECHNIQUES
Restructuring techniques involve the
amalgamation of related companies or the
winding-up – dissolution – of a subsidiary into its
parent company. Losses and other tax attributes
accumulated in a subsidiary may generally be
rolled over to its parent company upon the
winding up of a 90 percent owned subsidiary into
its parent5 (Brooks, 2008). The losses of the
subsidiary in this situation may be utilized by the
parent company to provide tax relief. 
Similarly, when a business with losses merges
with a related corporation, pre-existing losses may
generally be carried over to the new amalgamated
entity, provided that there is continuing control
(generally 50 percent) and operation. The new
entity may carry these losses forward6 to reduce its
taxes in the future.7 It should be noted that while
both techniques allow for the transfer of losses
between related corporations, they are the result of
a business reorganization that would have not
otherwise occurred and that may be costly, time
consuming and otherwise disturb normal business
activities. In addition, following an amalgamation
of related companies, a corporation is generally
prohibited from carrying back the losses taken
over to create a tax refund.
2. FINANCIAL AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS
AMONG RELATED COMPANIES
Corporate groups may use a variety of
arrangements to generate income in loss-making
subsidiaries and create expenses in profitable
subsidiaries. One of the most popular techniques
involves the artificial creation of an interest charge
in one member of a corporate group with the
corresponding interest income going to another
member of the group. 
For example, take a profitable parent company
and its wholly owned subsidiary that has
accumulated losses for tax purposes. The parent
company acquires common shares of its subsidiary,
which then lends the proceeds back to the parent
2 See Couzin (1991) for a review of the various provisions of the Canadian tax system that are most relevant to the transfer of losses among related
corporations. Brooks (2008) also provides an overview of various aspects of corporate income tax legislation with respect to corporate groups.
3 The CRA (1990) determined that the “Explanatory Notes to Draft Legislation and Regulations Relating to Income Tax Reform issued by the
Minister of Finance in June 1988 state that the transfer of income between related corporations that is accomplished using transactions that are
legally effective would not usually result in a misuse of the provisions of the [Income Tax] Act or an abuse of the Act read as a whole.”
4 The general anti-avoidance rule, introduced in 1987, is intended to deny tax benefits derived from abusive or artificial tax avoidance transactions.
In other words, the rule prohibits transactions misusing provisions of the Income Tax Act to defeat the spirit of the Act. 
5 Section 88, the Income Tax Act.
6 Current-year, non-capital tax losses of a corporation may generally be transferred to future years (up to 20 years) or prior years (up to three years). 
7 Section 87, the Income Tax Act.| 4 Commentary 284
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Box 2: An Example of Consolidation of Profits and Losses Reported by the Auditor General of Canada*




Subsidiary A Subsidiary B
Subco A1 Subco B1 Subco B2
Subco B3
Stage 1: Subsidiary A, which has tax losses carried forward largely in excess of $60 million, sells some of its
holdings to Subco A1, a subsidiary incorporated for the purpose of this tax-avoidance scheme, in exchange for
debt. The interest expenses on the debt create a large tax loss in Subco A1, while the interest income in
Subsidiary A is offset by its large pool of tax losses. Subco A1 then sells all of its holdings back to Subsidiary A
and is left with approximately $60 million in tax losses.
Stage 2: Subco B3, a profitable corporation which has paid taxes of approximately $100 million over the last
three years, sells all of its operating assets to Subco B1, a subsidiary incorporated for the purpose of this tax-
avoidance scheme, in exchange for preferred shares that are then redeemed. Subco B3 becomes a shell company
that has paid taxes in the past, while Subco B1 is now the operating company. Subsidiary A and Subsidiary B
then proceed to exchange their respective ownership interests in Subco A1 and Subco B2. Subco A1, now under
the control of Subsidiary B, is amalgamated with Subco B1 to form Amalco. Subco B2 is wound up into
Subsidiary A.
Parent Company
Subsidiary A Subsidiary B
Subco B3 Amalco
Stage 3: Amalco is now able to use the Subco A1 tax losses carried forward to offset future profits of Subco B1,
the profitable operating company. Subsidiary A, on the other hand, transfers some of its investments on a tax-
free basis to Subco B3 in exchange for debt and preferred shares. Subsidiary A uses its previously accumulated
pool of tax losses to avoid paying tax on the interest income, while Subco B3 uses the interest expenses created to
generate tax losses which are then carried back to claim a tax refund equal to approximately $100 million of
taxes previously paid by Subco B3.Commentary 284 | 5
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company at a commercial rate. The interest income
generated in the subsidiary may be used against its
losses, while the interest expense created in the
parent company may be used to reduce its taxable
income. In general, the CRA permits the use of
such tax planning strategies that take advantage of
deductible interest charges on inter-company loans
(CRA, 1990). 
Another, more straightforward method of
shifting income is to arrange the activities of
related firms so that the less profitable activities –
or fixed charges – of the group are relocated in the
most profitable corporations, and vice versa. A
corporate group may also arrange to hold assets in
a loss-making member of the group that could
then lease them, on a commercial basis, to
profitable members. Other methods for
transferring losses among members of a corporate
group include the sale of loss-making operations
to related companies and the charging of
intercompany fees for various administrative
services located in the least profitable group
member (Brooks 2008).
3. MIXTURE OF VARIOUSTECHNIQUES
Large corporations often use a combination of the
above techniques to better achieve a desired tax
outcome. The Auditor General of Canada, in his
November 1996 report to Parliament, showed
how a corporate group in Canada, using a web of
intercompany transactions, is able to use tax losses
incurred by one subsidiary to obtain a refund of
taxes paid by another and, as well, to reduce its
future tax liabilities without altering the basic
structure of the corporate group. Details of this
tax avoidance scheme are presented in Box 2. 
Current Issues 
Since Canadian corporate income tax legislation
does not provide for group taxation, tax planners
use a number of strategies, such as those found in
Box 2, which produce partly similar results and give
rise to a number of issues. Indeed, readers who
found the transactions outlined in Box 2 difficult to
follow will appreciate the efficiency loss to society
involved in such complex, tax-driven activities. In
this section, I discuss those issues, which also
constitute the policy rationale for the adoption of a
more formal system of group taxation in Canada.
1. CREATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND
LEGAL COSTS
Current loss-utilization techniques involve complex
transactions that may be costly to implement, not
to mention difficult for authorities to trace. Other
than management time and planning costs, tax-
planning strategies often involve substantial
accounting and administrative costs. Smaller
businesses, in particular, may not find it economical
to undertake such transactions because of these
associated costs. In addition, the complexity of
some of these tax-planning measures raises the issue
of higher auditing costs for tax collectors. 
2. GENERATION OF COMPLEXITIES
Large corporate groups may go to great lengths to
set up the web of intragroup transactions
necessary to shift profits and losses among related
corporations with common ownership of at least
50 percent. The Auditor General of Canada
(1996) found that some schemes involved more
than 30 individual transactions to accomplish the
desired loss consolidation. These transactions add
complexity and artificiality to the tax system.
Their artificial appearance may create difficulties
for auditors – and corporate managers – in trying
to establish the intent and determine the valid
business purpose of such transactions.
3. UNCERTAINTY OF OUTCOME
The Income Tax Act contains no comprehensive
system allowing for the consolidation of profits and
losses within corporate groups. Tax planning is
generally permitted to the extent that it is seen as
consistent with CRA’s administrative policy. The
level of complexity sometimes required to achieve
the transfer of tax losses leads to the question of
whether it was the intent of Parliament to allow for
corporate groups to pay tax on a consolidated basis
(Auditor General of Canada, 1996). Because
current loss-utilization techniques rely primarily on
an administrative policy, the regime does not| 6 Commentary 284
provide corporate taxpayers with the same level of
certainty as legislation.
4. NON-NEUTRALITY WITH RESPECTTO
CORPORATE STRUCTURE
The current regime is also economically inefficient
because corporations are taxed differently
depending on whether they segregate their business
operations based on divisions within a single
corporation or based on subsidiaries within a
corporate group. Hence, the system is not neutral
with respect to the legal structure of corporations.
Currently, the tax system generally discriminates
against firms operating through distinct corpor-
ations within a group, as opposed to divisions
within a single corporation, because only the latter
can file income taxes on a consolidated basis. 
Some techniques for consolidating losses, such
as mergers and windups, directly involve the
restructuring of business operations. The
Department of Finance (1985), among others, has
identified many valid business, non-tax reasons for
a corporation to choose to operate through a
group of subsidiaries. 
But the tax system should not be an important
consideration in the determination of a
corporation’s legal structure. From an efficient
management viewpoint, for instance, it may be
desirable to maintain the separate operational
independence, track records and corporate
marketing identities achieved by the segregation of
businesses in distinct but related companies. There
may also be labour and management issues arising
when corporations with distinct cultures and
unions merge into one conglomerate, or financial
considerations when subsidiaries within a group
have different costs of capital. 
From a risk-management perspective, the legal
structure of a corporation is an important factor
in determining the liability of investors.
Corporations with risky start-ups or projects may
wish to conduct such activities in separate
corporations to limit their financial liability and
overall exposure to risk. In addition, corporate
investors setting up new uncertain ventures may
find it desirable to co-invest with minority
shareholders who may contribute their own
expertise and networking to the success of
innovative projects. Finally, in some industries,
there are regulatory or legislative barriers to the
amalgamation of different business lines in a
single corporate entity. Such business decisions
should be based on merit, rather than tax
implications. 
5. CREATION OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR
INTERPROVINCIALTAX PLANNING
Corporate tax rates vary among provinces.
Combined federal and provincial/territorial
statutory corporate tax rates for 2008 varied from
a low of 29.5 percent in Alberta to a high of 35.5
percent in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island.
The current policy governing the transfer of
profits and losses among related companies offers
some opportunities for interprovincial tax
planning to take advantage of these tax rate
differences (Mintz and Smart, 2004). 
For example, in a closely related group of
corporations, the group may be in a position to
have losses or expenses reflected in provinces that
have higher corporate tax rates, and income in
provinces with lower rates of tax. Mintz and Smart
(2004) have shown that large corporations,
operating through subsidiaries incorporated in
various Canadian provinces, respond to variations
in provincial corporate tax rates by making use of
income-shifting to reduce the group’s overall
provincial tax burden. They estimated that a one
percentage point reduction in a provincial
corporate tax rate would result in an 8.5 percent
increase in the taxable income of corporate groups
in that province (Mintz and Smart, 2004). 
6. UNFAIRNESS
The ways in which different corporations are
generally able to use tax-planning strategies raises
an issue of fairness among different types of
corporations. Larger corporations will generally
have more options and be better equipped to
absorb the administrative and legal costs required
to plan and enter into complex intercompany
transactions. Also, some corporations within
corporate groups may be exposed to legislative,
regulatory, financial or other constraints that may
C.D. Howe InstituteCommentary 284 | 7
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be limiting their ability to use amalgamations and
windups to consolidate losses. Clearly, this
situation is inequitable to the extent that
corporations facing similar economic conditions
have different effective access to loss-sharing
provisions.
7. WEAKENING OF INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITIVENESS
With respect to the international competitiveness
of Canada’s tax system, the federal government
made progress in recent years by gradually
reducing the federal statutory corporate tax rate
from 28 percent in 2000 to a scheduled 15
percent by 2012. A more complete framework for
measuring the competitiveness of a tax system is
based on the calculation of marginal effective tax
rates (METRs) on capital. This measurement
assesses how the corporate tax system as a whole
affects new investment. In particular, all
measurable factors affecting the federal and
provincial determination of taxable income and
tax liabilities, such as investment tax credits, cost
allowances and sales taxes on business inputs, are
recognized in the computation of METRs on
business investment. The latest measurement of
Canada’s marginal effective tax rate on capital
(Chen and Mintz, 2008) shows that Canada’s tax
burden on business investment still ranks 11th
highest among 80 countries – notably behind the
United States, the United Kingdom and Mexico –
and that more progress is required. 
It is important to recognize that the impact of
taxation is dependent upon the tax base as much
as tax rates. Many developed countries offer some
form of group reporting systems (Table 1).
Canada is the only country within the Group of
Seven (G7) without a statutory group tax relief
Table 1: Group Taxation Around the World, Selected Countries
Source: Various
Countries Providing a System   Countries With No Statutory System





















United States| 8 Commentary 284
mechanism. To make Canada’s corporate tax
system more internationally competitive with
respect to the determination of the tax base,
Ottawa should follow suit when it comes to group
corporate taxation. Such a measure has the added
benefit of being an alternative to further statutory
tax-rate reductions (Donnelly and Young 2002). 
Doing so would also have the effect of lowering
the marginal expected effective tax rate on capital
in Canada.8 A lower cost of capital benefits
Canadian companies competing with firms
internationally. It also makes Canada more
attractive to foreign investors, resulting in gains in
domestic economic activity, productivity and
labour compensation growth. 
Policy Implications
Instituting a system of group taxation provides an
opportunity to improve the tax system by
addressing the concerns described in the previous
section. A number of stakeholders – including tax
practitioners, academics, government-appointed
bodies and the Auditor General – have
recommended reforming the Canadian policy
with respect to group taxation. This section briefly
looks at how other countries have chosen to
implement group taxation and then suggests the
policy implications of such a regime for Canada. 
1. GROUPTAXATION: WHAT ARETHE
POLICY OPTIONS?
France, Germany, the United States, Australia,
Italy and Japan operate one kind or another of
group tax consolidation regimes (KPMG 2007).
Most of these systems are legislatively complex,
leading to relatively high administration and
compliance costs. For example, group tax
consolidation typically involves the elimination of
intragroup transactions  such as intragroup sales,
gains on transfer of assets and payments of interest
or dividends. At the group level, there are special
rules to deal with members upon leaving the
group, separate anti-tax avoidance provisions and
other requirements with respect to the eligibility
and length of agreements (Jones Day 2003). 
In France and the United States, the parent
company aggregates all group members’ profits
and losses, eliminates intragroup transactions,
makes other adjustments and files a tax return for
the entire group. In France, as well, each group
member is required to file a separate tax return,
although it is not required to pay the tax shown
on the return. In both countries, the parent is
required to pay the consolidated tax owed, even
though US group members are jointly and
severally liable for the entire group tax liability
while French group members are only liable for
their share of the consolidated tax bill.
In the United States, only a domestic
corporation may be the parent of a consolidated
group, while in France permanent establishments
of foreign companies are also allowed to head a
corporate tax group. In the United States, the
parent company must own at least 80 percent of
each subsidiary’s voting rights. In France, the
group definition requires the parent company to
own at least 95 percent of the share capital of each
subsidiary. 
In the United States as well, each of the
qualifying group members must be part of the
consolidated tax group and may not voluntarily
leave the group. In France, each eligible group
member is free to be outside of the consolidated tax
group and continue to pay tax separately.
Conversely, a French subsidiary in the consolidated
tax group may leave the group at any time.
Germany, Sweden, Finland and Norway take a
different approach, sometimes labelled as profit-
transfer systems (Lockwood and Pantaleo 2002),
than the French and the Americans. Sweden, for
example, permits the transfer of taxable income on
an annual basis between profitable and loss-making
group members. In Germany, the so-called
“Organschaft” approach is a give and take between
the consolidation of profits and losses on the one
hand and group-loss transfer models on the other.
C.D. Howe Institute
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In other countries, only losses may be transferred
among the eligible related companies. In practice,
these types of group taxation – commonly known as
“group relief” or “group-loss transfer systems” – are
designed to achieve a similar result to that of full tax
consolidation systems, but are usually less complex
and easier to administer.9 Ireland, Singapore and the
United Kingdom, for example, operate loss-transfer
systems. The UK group-relief system allows for non-
capital losses to be transferred on a current-year basis
between profitable and loss-making related
corporations that are at least 75 percent owned by
their parent company. 
As part of the 1985 federal budget, the
Department of Finance released a discussion paper
that would have allowed for the transfer of non-
capital losses within a commonly owned group of
corporations. Officials put forward three basic
approaches to group reporting: full consolidation,
refundability of losses and intercorporate transfer of
losses. They favoured the group-loss transfer system
because it was considered the least disruptive to the
tax system and less complex to administer, while
minimizing federal budgetary cost implications
(Department of Finance Canada 1985). 
Under the federal proposal, members of a
corporate group would have been able to transfer
current non-capital losses, on an annual elective
basis, subject to a 95 percent common ownership
requirement. Certain group members – investment
corporations, mortgage investment corporations,
mutual fund corporations, cooperative corporations,
credit unions and deposit insurance corporations –
would have been excluded from the proposed loss-
transfer regime. Other group members, such as farm
corporations and insurance companies, would have
been allowed only to transfer losses to another
corporation within the same class of business
(Department of Finance Canada 1985).
2. TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS ATTHE PROVINCIAL
ANDTERRITORIAL LEVELS
The main advantages of the proposed 1985 federal
tax-loss transfer system were its relatively low levels
of complexity and fiscal and compliance costs. In
addition, the proposal received the general support
of the business and tax-practitioner communities.
The main drawback of the federal proposal,
however, was its potential asymmetric effect on
provincial tax revenues, which limited its acceptance
among provincial governments. Under a loss-transfer
regime, provincial tax revenues in a province where
corporate losses are being transferred would diminish,
while future tax revenues in the loss-originating
province would increase through reduced losses
carried forward. As the Department of Finance
(1985) pointed out, the result would be an
interprovincial transfer of fiscal revenues. 
Although interprovincial transfers of losses would
typically cancel out at an aggregate level, there are,
nevertheless, reasons to believe that the proposed
loss-transfer regime would lead to a permanent
interprovincial shifting of tax revenues. First, there
is the obvious fear that corporations would organize
their affairs so as to recognize losses in provinces
with a higher corporate income tax rate and income
in provinces with a lower tax rate. As well, the
Department of Finance (1985) identified several
structural and regional economic differences – such
as the location of industries with access to high
levels of tax incentives, the location of cyclical
industries and the relative predominance of mature
or start-up industries – which could cause an
enduring shift in provincial tax revenues. 
In light of issues raised with respect to provincial
corporate income taxation, the adoption of a
federal-only, group-taxation system has been
proposed on a few occasions (Tax Executive
Institute 2003). However, adopting a federal-only
regime of group taxation is clearly unattractive as it
would only partially address the issues from which
the need for group taxation originates in the first
place. Indeed, some significant provincial tax
benefits could still be gained from continuing to
use the current, indirect methods of transferring
losses among related corporations. In addition, it
would create an undesirable division between
federal and provincial corporate-income-tax bases,
wiping out the private and public benefits obtained
from harmonization. 
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3. A VIABLE APPROACH FOR CANADA
Any viable Canadian group-taxation solution would
have to address implications for provincial tax
revenue. An appropriate approach would lead to
similar tax burdens for similar business activities
whether those activities are conducted in multiple
provincial/territorial jurisdictions through various
branches of a single legal entity or through various
members of a corporate group. 
Corporations operating as a single entity with
divisions located in various provinces and territories
currently allocate their consolidated taxable income
according to the general interprovincial allocation
formula, which has served Canada well since 1946.10
The formula is based on the average share of gross
revenues and total salaries earned or paid in various
provinces and territories in which the corporation
has a permanent presence. 
Therefore, adopting a group tax-reporting
regime in which the parent company pays
provincial/territorial tax for the entire group based
on current allocation rules would accomplish
interprovincial tax neutrality with respect to
corporate organiza-tional structuring. Such an
approach would facilitate reaching provincial
cooperation with respect to group taxation as it
would ensure that the provincial/ territorial fiscal
cost is shared on the basis of currently accepted
allocation principles, while limiting opportunities
for interprovincial tax planning based on
corporate organizational structuring.
It should be possible to develop such a group-
taxation regime partly based on the German model.
In Germany, transfers of profits are only allowed
between a parent and a subsidiary; each group
member must sign a profit-and-loss transfer
agreement with its group parent, effective for a
minimum of five years. Under the agreement, group
subsidiaries are obligated to transfer their profits to
the parent company which, in return, must
reimburse the losses of its subsidiaries. 
Actual cash payments are not required, but
intercompany transfers must be booked in the
financial records. All group members must
determine their own taxable income separately and
then the taxable profits and tax losses of group
members are aggregated at the parent company level
(European Commission 2006).
The German profit-transfer system does not
require the elimination of intragroup transactions at
the consolidated level. A transfer agreement may be
signed between a parent and a 50 percent-owned
subsidiary, providing flexibility for minority interests
within the corporate group. Since all profits of a
subsidiary must be remitted to the parent, minority
shareholders are entitled to compensating payments,
which are taxed in the hands of the subsidiary and
deducted from the subsidiary’s profits being
transferred (Lockwood and Pantaleo 2002). 
For Canada, I propose a model that would allow
domestic subsidiaries of corporate groups to transfer,
on paper, their taxable income, net of deductions, to
their Canadian-incorporated parent company along
with current-year, non-capital losses and federal
credits. Once transferred, unclaimed tax losses and
credits would carry forward and accumulate at the
parent company level. Although each subsidiary
would still be required to compute a separate tax
return, taxes for the entire group would be payable
by the parent company without requiring the
elimination of intragroup transactions. 
To effectively address concerns with respect 
to provincial/territorial tax revenues, all eligible
members of the corporate group should be
compelled to participate in the tax group.
Mandatory participation is necessary to ensure 
that group taxation does not simply create more
opportunity for tax planning and avoidance 
on the part of corporate groups. 
Provincial/territorial taxes would be computed
in each jurisdiction based on the current
interprovincial allocation rules for taxable
income.11 An illustration of how this model could
work is shown in Box 3. Under this proposal,
provincial taxes are paid based on a corporate
10 Finance and insurance, transportation and other specific activities use a different formula (Technical Committee on Business Taxation, 1998).
11 The allocation rules would have to be amended to eliminate intragroup sales to avoid distortions.Commentary 284 | 11
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Scenario 1 – Single Legal Entity: Parts A and Sales and
Financing B are operating divisions of Parent Durable
Inc. The corporation pays tax at the federal level on its
consolidated taxable income of $50 million. At the
provincial level, taxable income is allocated among
provinces based on the allocation formula – i.e., the
average of the share of gross revenues attributable to
each province and the share of wages and salaries paid
in each province. 
Scenario 2 – Corporate Group of Subsidiaries, No Loss
or Profit Shifting: Parts A and Sales and Financing B
are wholly owned subsidiaries of Parent Durable Inc.
Each corporation within the group is required to pay
tax individually based on its own assessment of taxable
income. In total, the group pays tax on $110 million of
taxable income and carries forward a loss of $60
million that may be used to reduce future tax liabilities.
Scenario 3 – Corporate Group of Subsidiaries, Tax
Planning Arrangements: Parts A and Sales and
Financing B are wholly owned subsidiaries of Parent
Durable Inc. Each corporation within the group is
required to pay tax individually. However, through
intragroup tax-planning strategies such as those
described in Section B and Box 2, Parent Durable Inc.
is able to transfer $30 million of its $60 million
current-year loss to Sales and Financing B, while Sales
and Financing B, located in the high-tax province, is
able to shift $40 million of its large profit to Parts B,
located in the low-tax province. In effect, the group
pays tax on $80 million of taxable income and carries
forward a loss of $30 million that may be used to
reduce future tax liabilities.
Proposed Group Taxation Regime: Parts A and Sales
and Financing B are wholly owned subsidiaries of
Parent Durable Inc. Under the proposed approach,
both Parts A and Sales and Financing B would transfer,
on paper, their profits to Parent Durable Inc., which
would then pay taxes on the aggregated net taxable
income of $50 million. At the provincial level, taxable
income would be allocated among provinces based on
the current allocation formula applying for single entity
corporation; i.e., the average of the share of gross
revenues attributable to each province and the share of
wages and salaries paid in each province.
Outcome: Both federal and provincial tax burdens
under the proposed group taxation regime would be
similar to those that would have been obtained had 
the group operated under a single legal entity. The
corporate group is able to utilize tax losses more
effectively and more quickly.
Box 3: Comparison of Hypothetical Taxable Income Calculations under the Proposed Group Taxation
Regime and Various Scenarios
Source: Various
Parts A
– Small profit of $10 million
– Low provincial tax rate
– Accounts for 30% of total wages and salaries
and 30% of total gross revenues
Provincial taxable income under:
Scenario 1 – Single entity: $15 million
Scenario 2 – Group, no shifting: $10 million
Scenario 3 – Group, tax planning: $50 million
Group Tax Proposal: $15 million
Parent Durable Inc.
– Non-capital loss of $60 million
– Average provincial tax rate
– Accounts for 50% of total wages and salaries
and 30% of total gross revenues
Provincial taxable income under:
Scenario 1 – Single entity: $20 million
Scenario 2 – Group, no shifting: -$60 million
Scenario 3 – Group, tax planning: -$30 million
Group Tax Proposal: $20 million
Sales and Financing B
– Large profit of $100 million
– High provincial tax rate
– Accounts for 20% of total wages and salaries
and 40% of total gross revenues
Provincial taxable income under:
Scenario 1 – Single entity: $15 million
Scenario 2 – Group, no shifting: $100 million
Scenario 3 – Group, tax planning: $30 million
Group Tax Proposal: $15 million| 12 Commentary 284
group’s contribution to employment and sales,
which would remove incentives for interprovincial
tax planning based solely on financial transactions. 
Although the illustration in Box 3 shows a
significant shift of income from one jurisdiction to
others, there would likely be compensating
movements. Ultimately, aggregate provincial tax
revenues would be a function of the economic
activity generated in each province.
One possibility would be to require that a
common parent company holds, directly or
indirectly, at least 95 percent of a subsidiary’s voting
rights. This option would limit the need to provide
adjustments for minority interests in a subsidiary.12
Another possibility would be to facilitate corporate
financing through subsidiaries by adopting a lower
ownership threshold of 50 percent along with new
rules providing for compensating deductible
payments to minority shareholders – based on the
German model – and other necessary adjustments. 
A low common ownership threshold would be
preferable because it would ensure that related
corporations with significant minority interests
would be provided with an incentive to discontinue
their use of existing loss-sharing methods. The
necessity to develop special rules to protect and
compensate minority shareholders for the transfer of
losses from one entity to another, however, would
add complexity to the system.
This transfer proposal would not yield the same
tax result as full consolidation – for example,
elimination of intragroup transactions would not be
required – and would be more complex to design
and implement than would the federal loss-transfer
proposal. However, the manner in which members
of corporate groups currently arrive at loss
consolidation is also complex and certainly more
opaque and difficult to administer than if loss
consolidation would be achieved through a more
transparent legislated process. 
4. BUDGETARY REVENUE CONSIDERATIONS
Providing a transparent legislated process for
group taxation in Canada could lead to an
immediate reduction of federal and provincial
government revenues, as it would extend the
benefits of tax consolidation to corporations
currently unable to transfer losses. However, many
corporations do currently engage in sharing of tax
losses and shifting of income through other,
indirect, means. Therefore, the relative revenue
cost to governments in the longer term could be
less than a static analysis would suggest. 
Another important consideration is one of timing
of loss recognition. Under a group-taxation regime,
firms would be able to use losses more rapidly and
more cost-effectively. Therefore, if one supposes that
all losses and tax credits carried forward into future
years will eventually be monetized,13 the real fiscal
cost to governments of group taxation would be
narrowed to the time value of taking advantage of tax
attributes more quickly.
5. ECONOMIC BENEFITS
Currently, the treatment of taxable profits differs
from that of tax losses in that profits are fully taxed
when they arise, while tax losses are only partially
refundable. Tax refunds with respect to losses are
limited by the amount of taxes paid in the prior three
years. The remaining losses must be carried forward
in anticipation that they will be used to offset future
profits. This asymmetric treatment of tax loss
penalizes investors because losses carried forward
may never be used, while their real value diminishes
substantially over time due to inflation and forgone
investment return. Cooper and Knittel (2006) have
shown that the US tax system leads to “substantial
delays between the generation and utilization of the
tax loss.” 
The proposed group-taxation regime would
increase the ability of firms to use tax losses and use
them more quickly, thereby reducing the economic
C.D. Howe Institute
s. 
12 However, one can make an argument that minority shareholders would still demand to be protected and compensated for tax losses
transferred elsewhere in the group.
13 This assumption is a simplification as a portion of losses carried forward will most likely never be used. A recent study of the utilization of
tax losses in the United States showed that approximately 25 to 30 percent of tax losses carried forward over a 10-year period never get
utilized due to business failures (Cooper and Knittel, 2006).Commentary 284 | 13
costs associated with partial refundability. Figure 1
shows the ratio of current-year tax losses as a
percentage of taxable income over the 1988-to-2006
period. Figure 1 also shows a simulation of the
possible impact of corporate groups being able to use
current-year tax losses more quickly to offset taxable
income.14
Mintz (1988, 1996) has shown that the current
asymmetric treatment of tax losses discriminates
against risk-taking and entrepreneurship since
expected taxes disproportionately reduce the rate of
return expected on risky investments when
compared to riskless investments – that is, the after-
tax risk premium on investments. Therefore, by
improving the after-tax return on risky investments
for corporate taxpayers, the proposed group-
reporting regime would likely lead to greater risk-
taking and investment in the economy. 
Moreover, the ability to use tax losses more
effectively may also enable corporate groups to
maintain loss-making operations in certain
subsidiaries during cyclical downturns for a longer
period of time than would otherwise have been
possible. In a way, it may help firms stabilize their
operations by reducing the incidence of temporary
disruptions in production or hiring plans due to
cyclical slowdowns (Cooper and Knittel 2006).
Indeed, the ratio of tax losses to taxable income
increased significantly in the last two cyclical
downturns in Canada (Figure 1). 
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14 Assuming that 15 percent of current-year tax losses are being used in the current year instead of being carried forward to future years. This
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Figure 1: Current-Year Tax Losses as a Percentage of Taxable Income
*Assumes a purely hypothetical 15% increase in the utilization of tax losses.
Source: Statistics Canada.| 14 Commentary 284
Group taxation may also improve the
responsiveness of loss-making firms to various tax-
incentive measures. To be effective in the short term,
tax measures such as accelerated depreciation
schemes and non-refundable tax credits require that
benefiting corporations be in a tax-paying position.
The proposed group-tax reporting regime, for
example, may enable firms within corporate groups
to make better use of investment tax credits. 
Conclusion
Corporate groups in Canada are generally able to use
various intragroup transactions to consolidate –
although imperfectly – the profits and losses of
group members and thus reduce tax liabilities at the
group level. The federal government has generally
allowed the use of such tax-planning strategies so
long as each transaction employed in the process
complies with existing laws and regulations. 
Canada’s position with respect to group taxation
gives rise to a number of issues. For example, large
corporations are likely to engage in complex
intragroup transactions, leading to higher
administrative costs and uncertainty. Furthermore, a
number of regulatory or financial constraints may
preclude some corporations from using the same tax-
planning strategies as those available to their
counterparts, leading to unfairness in the tax system. 
An ideal tax system should not interfere with the
organizational decisions of corporations. It should
not provide incentives to restructure to reap tax
benefits. Moreover, many countries have a legislative
framework in place providing for some types of
group taxation, putting Canadian corporations at a
competitive disadvantage. 
These concerns point to the need to consider a
comprehensive legislative framework, allowing for
the transfer of profits and losses of corporate groups
for federal and provincial tax purposes. A workable
approach would be to establish a system in which
each eligible subsidiary of a group would determine
its own tax base separately, including taxable profits,
current-year tax losses and federal credits. These
amounts would then be transferred, on paper, from
the subsidiaries to the parent company, which would
then pay taxes for the entire group based on the
aggregated transferred amounts and its own tax
attributes. Provincial taxes payable could be
computed based on the existing allocation formula.
Providing a comprehensive group-taxation regime
would bring fairness, simplicity and certainty of tax
outcome for Canadian corporations. It would improve
the competitiveness of Canada’s tax system with
respect to the determination of the corporate tax base
and would ensure that the tax system remains neutral
with respect to business-structuring decisions, thereby
contributing to a better environment for domestic and
foreign investment in Canada.
C.D. Howe InstituteCommentary 284 | 15
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